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Abstract
The call auction is a widely used trading mechanism, especially during the opening and
closing periods of financial markets. In this paper, we study a standard call auction problem
where orders are submitted according to Poisson processes, with random prices distributed
according to a general distribution F , and may be cancelled at any time. We compute the
analytical expressions of the distributions of the traded volume, of the lower and upper
bounds of the clearing prices, and of the price range of these possible clearing prices of the
call auction. Using results from the theory of order statistics and a theorem on the limit of
sequences of random variables with independent random indices, we derive the weak limits
of all these distributions. In this setting, traded volume and bounds of the clearing prices
are found to be asymptotically normal, while the clearing price range is asymptotically
exponential. All the parameters of these distributions are explicitly derived as functions of
the parameters of the incoming orders’ flows.
1 Introduction
During the past decades, financial markets have progressively adopted forms of continuous dou-
ble auctions as the main structure of exchange. In a continuous double auction, traders can
submit trading orders at any time, and these orders are immediately treated. A centralized
structure, the order book, stores the list of non-filled orders. Any buy (resp. sell) order sub-
mitted with a limit price lower (resp. higher) than the best ask (resp. bid) price is stored in
the order book (limit order). Any buy (resp. sell) order submitted with a price higher (resp.
lower) than the best ask (resp. bid) is executed (filled), and the order book is modified ac-
cordingly (market order or crossing limit order). Finally, any limit order waiting in the order
book can be cancelled at any time. As of today, major trading systems use the continuous
double auction at least during the main trading day period. As a consequence, microstructure
theory has a large and growing body of literature focusing on the continuous double auction and
order book modelling, both empirical (see e.g. Biais et al. , 1995; Challet & Stinchcombe, 2001;
Bouchaud et al. , 2002; Potters & Bouchaud, 2003; Mike & Farmer, 2008, among others) and
theoretical (see e.g. Smith et al. , 2003; Preis et al. , 2006; Cont et al. , 2010; Abergel & Jedidi,
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2013; Muni Toke, 2014). See also Bouchaud et al. (2009); Chakraborti et al. (2011) for some
review material.
The choice of the continuous double auction was mainly done during the computerization
of the financial stock exchanges all over the world, starting in the 1980’s. Such a choice was
however not obvious, and another trading mechanism, the periodic call auction, has had its
supporters. In a periodic call auction, trading orders can be submitted continuously but are
filled only periodically, using some clearing mechanism. During the auction time, all submit-
ted orders are stored (and may be cancelled at any time), whatever their submission price is.
Then at some pre-determined time the auction is closed, and the cumulative bid and offer are
computed as functions of the price. The clearing price is chosen upon consideration of these
functions, following a set of pre-agreed rules that aim at maximizing the trading volume, mini-
mizing the market imbalance, etc. (see e.g. Comerton-Forde & Rydge, 2006a,b, for examples of
clearing rules). Once a clearing price is computed, all exchanges are done all at the same time.
Proponents of the call auction mechanism argued that the call auction might help reducing
trading cost and enhancing price discovery (see e.g. Pagano & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz et al. ,
2003), and the call auction has been used as the main trading mechanism of the Arizona Stock
Exchange that has been operational from 1990 to 2001. Note also that recent trading accidents
due to uncontrolled algorithmic trading have raised some new interests for the call auction: its
non-continuous periodic trading times may appear as a potential solution against ”flash crashes”
such as the one observed on the NYSE on May 6th, 2010.
As of today, the call auction is used in different trading procedures, according to rules
that often depend on the liquidity of the traded stocks. For example, the call auction is the
main trading mechanism for the least traded equities on the Euronext French regulated market.
These stocks are not continuously traded but are actually fully exchanged using call auctions
that take place once a day for some stocks, and twice a day for most of them, at 11:30 a.m.
and 4:30 p.m. (Euronext, 2013). A better known example is the use of the call auction to
determine opening and closing prices for liquid stocks, that are otherwise traded according to
a continuous double auction throughout the trading day. For example, the typical trading day
for continuously-traded liquid stocks on the Euronext French regulated market is as follows.
The trading day starts with an opening call auction until 9:00 a.m.: all orders submitted before
this time are ”automatically recorded in the Central Order Book without giving rise to trades”.
Then at 9:00 a.m., the clearing of the call auction takes place, which determines the opening
price. From 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., trading is done according to the continuous double auction.
At 5:30 p.m. starts the closing call auction. During 5 minutes, submitted orders are again
”automatically recorded in the Central Order Book without giving rise to trades”. At 5:35
p.m., the market is cleared, and this closing auction determines the closing price. The trading
day ends with five minutes of ”Trading at last” in which trades can be made at the closing price
(see Euronext, 2013, 2014, for more details).
Despite the wide interest in the call auction, microstructure literature on this mechanism
is scarce. The seminal work in this field is due to Mendelson (1982), in which the call auction
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described here is called a ”clearing house” mechanism. These results were later used for a
comparison between call auction and continuous double auction by Domowitz & Wang (1994),
and the paper enjoys an increasing trend in citations in recent microstructure papers. Mendelson
(1982) models a call auction in which buy and sell orders are submitted with size one and a price
uniformly distributed on some interval (0,m). In the case where buy and sell orders are assumed
to be Poisson processes with identical parameters, the author derives the distribution of the
traded volume as well as the first moments of the price distribution. However, in the general
case with potential market imbalance (i.e. with different processes governing the arrival of buy
and sell orders), weaker results are only obtained through the use of asymptotic renewal theory
results, in the form of second-order expansions of the first and second moments of the traded
volume and the price distributions. The main assumption required for these approximations
to be acceptable is that the market must be ”thick” in Mendelson’s words, i.e. very liquid.
Therefore the results mentionned above are not valid in the case of an illiquid market where
the probability that no transaction occurs during a call auction is not negligible.
In this paper, we provide the complete solution of the call auction described in Mendelson
(1982), even in the case where this seminal paper stated that such general forms did not ex-
ist. We show that the problem of determining the traded volume and the price distributions
is analytically tractable, even in the general case of market imbalance and a general price dis-
tribution. Perhaps more importantly, we derive rigorous weak limits of the exact distributions
obtained, showing the asymptotic normality of the traded volume and the price distributions
as the liquidity increases. Similarly, it is proved that in this setting the clearing price range, a
proxy to the post-clearing spread, is asymptotically exponentially distributed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the call auction is described
and it is shown that, conditionally on the number of submitted bid and ask orders, the traded
volume and price distribution are easily analytically tractable. In section 3, the exact uncondi-
tional distribution of the traded volume is derived, as well as its weak limit when the liquidity
increases. It is shown that the orders’ price distribution does not influence this distribution,
and that the market imbalance (ratio between the expected number of bid and ask orders) has
a non trivial influence on the limit distribution. Using in particular fundamental results of
the theory of order statistics, section 4 derives similar results for the distributions of the lower
and upper clearing price, and section 5 for the distribution of the range of potential clearing
prices. The scaling constants are again non-trivial and depend on the market imbalance as
well as the orders’ price distribution. As all these results are derived without any cancellation
mechanism, section 6 shows that, thanks to a simple substitution in the model parameters, all
results can easily be generalized to the case where submitted limit orders are cancelled after an
exponentially distributed lifetime.
To our knowledge, all these results are new.
Notations: We will use the following (usual) notations in the remainder of the paper:
N (m,σ) denotes the normal distribution with mean m and standard deviation σ ; Φ denotes
the cumulative distribution function of N (0, 1) ; B(n, p) denotes the binomial distribution with
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n trials and success probability p ; E(λ) denotes the exponential distribution with parameter
λ (inverse of the mean) ;
d−→
n→+∞
denotes the weak convergence as n tends to infinity (see e.g.
Billingsley, 1999) ; ⌊x⌋ denotes the integer part of a real number x ; , will be used for the
definition equality. Finally, all random variables and processes subsequently used in this paper
are assumed to be defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P).
2 Description of the call auction and preliminary results
Let us consider a standard call auction for the exchange of a given financial product. Ask (sell)
orders are submitted at random times according to a Poisson process with parameter λA. We
assume that all ask orders are unit-sized, and that their prices form a set of independent random
variables identically distributed according to some distribution F . Similarly, bid (buy) orders
are submitted at random times according to an independent Poisson process with parameter
λB . It is assumed as well that all bid orders are unit-sized, and that their prices form a set
of independent random variables identically distributed according to the distribution F . The
assumption that bid and ask orders are submitted according to the same distribution may
seem very basic, but it is the one used by Mendelson (1982) and it is actually fundamental to
the following analysis (see Remark 1). It is a purely zero-intelligence assumption, where no
prior information on the price is incorporated into the model. Note however that we have no
restriction on F , which consequently can potentially accomodate a wide range of empirical fits.
In any case, without further empirical investigations on the placement of order during a call
auction, it should not be discarded, given its analytical potential.
Market imbalance, which represents the relative shares of bid and ask submissions, is thus
described by the parameter α ,
λA
λ
where λ , λA + λB is the total rate of orders submission.
Obviously, the market is symmetric when α =
1
2
.
The call auction opens (i.e. starts accepting order submission) at time 0 and closes at a
deterministic time T > 0. For the ease of exposition and computation, no cancellation of a
submitted trading order is allowed for the moment, but this restriction will easily be lifted in
section 6. Once the call auction is closed, all submitted orders are taken into account and the
market is cleared, i.e. a clearing price (or exchange price, or trading price in the literature)
is decided. There are several types of rules used in practice to determine the clearing price
(see e.g. Comerton-Forde & Rydge, 2006a, Table 1), most of which start with maximizing the
traded volume. For a given clearing price p, the traded volume is defined as the quantity of
shares that can be matched at that price, ans is equal to the minimum of the total ask quantity
offered below p and the total bid quantity offered above p. There is not necessarily a unique
price that maximizes the traded volume, and more rules may be used in practice to determine
a unique price. In this study however, one of our main output will be the range of possible
clearing prices maximizing the traded volume, and we will not use further rules to determine a
unique price.
Let us rephrase this description mathematically. Let A(p) be the cumulative number of
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Figure 1: Example of the clearing mechanism ending a call auction, with price on the x-axis
and volumes on the y-axis. The cumulative number of ask orders A(p) is in red, while the
cumulative number of bid orders B(p) is in blue. V is the traded volume and (L,U) is the range
of possible clearing prices.
ask orders up to price p at time T . p 7→ A(p) is P-almost surely a positive non-decreasing
right-continuous step function, with unit-size steps. Similarly, B(p) is the cumulative number
of bid orders down to price p, and p 7→ B(p) is P-almost surely a positive non-increasing left-
continuous step function, with unit-size steps. Conditionally on A(∞) , lim
p→+∞
A(p) ≥ 1 and
B(−∞) , lim
p→−∞
B(p) ≥ 1, i.e. assuming that there is at least one buy order and one sell order,
p is a clearing price maximizing the traded volume V if and only if A(p) = B(p). Since all
orders are unit-sized, the clearing price maximizing the traded volume is P-almost surely not
unique. Furthermore, the monotony of A and B ensures that the set of possible exchange prices
is an interval (L,U). A detailed illustration is provided on figure 2 (some of the notations used
there will be introduced later in the text).
The basic finding that helps us solving the general call auction problem is that, conditionally
on the random variables A(∞) and B(−∞), which denote the number of ask and bid orders
submitted upon the closing of the call auction, the system is actually easily tractable using the
framework of order statistics, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let (m,n) ∈ (N∗)2. Conditionally on the set {A(∞) = m,B(−∞) = n},
1. the traded volume V is hypergeometrically distributed:
∀k ∈ {0, . . . ,min(n,m)}, P(V = k|A(∞) = m,B(−∞) = n) =
(m
k
)(n
k
)
(m+n
n
) , (1)
and the distribution of the traded volume does not depend on the price distribution F ;
2. the lowest possible clearing prices L maximizing the traded volume is distributed as the n-th
order statistics of a random sample with size n+m distributed with distribution function
F ;
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3. the highest possible clearing prices U maximizing the traded volume is distributed as the
(n+1)-th order statistics of a random sample with size n+m distributed with distribution
function F .
Proof. Assume that the call auction is closed and that A(∞) = m and B(−∞) = n. All
n +m orders form a set of n +m (independent and identically distributed) points on R. Let
x1 < . . . < xn+m be this increasing finite sequence of points on the real line. Let us consider
this set of points given and decide whether a given point xi is an ask order (m points should
be ”ask” in the whole set) or a bid order (n points should be ”bid” in the whole set). There
is obviously
(
n+m
n
)
different ways to decide this attribution. Assume now that exactly k
points among the highest m ones {xn+1, . . . , xn+m} are bid orders. Then necessarily there are
exactly n−k bid orders and k ask orders among lowest n points {x1, . . . , xn}. As a consequence,
A(p) = k = B(p) for any p in (xn, xn+1). The monotonicity of A and B ensures that we cannot
have A(p) = B(p) outside this interval. Henceforth, the traded volume is k if and only if there
is k bid orders among the highest m orders, and n − k among the lowest n orders. There is
obviously
(
m
k
)(
n
n− k
)
ways to do this, hence the first result given at equation (1). Finally,
the same argument stating the monotonicity of A and B ensures that a necessary and sufficient
condition for a price p to be an exchange price maximizing the traded volume is to lie in the
price interval (xn, xn+1), hence the second and third results.
For the sake of completeness, we provide the sketch of the full proof by calculus, leaving
the details of the computation to the reader. Let us consider the call auction closed. Let
(XAi )i=1,...,A(∞) be the (almost surely finite) sequence of prices of the submitted ask orders, and
(XBj )j=1,...,B(−∞) be the (almost surely finite) sequence of prices of the submitted bid orders.
Using standard notations for order statistics, let XA(i) denote the i-th ask order when ordered
increasingly in price : XA(1) < . . . < X
A
(A(∞)). Similarly, X
B
(j) is the j-th bid order when ordered
increasingly in price. We will also use the following conventions : XA(0) = X
B
(0) = −∞ and
XA(N) = +∞ (resp. XB(N) = +∞) if N > A(∞) (resp. N > B(−∞)). One can verify that:
P (V = k|A(∞) = m,B(−∞) = n)
=P
(
XA(k) < X
B
(n−k+1),X
A
(k+1) > X
B
(n−k)|A(∞) = m,B(−∞) = n
)
. (2)
Now, using the independence of the bid and ask processes and knowing the joint distributions
of any couple of order statistics (see e.g. David & Nagaraja, 2003; Arnold et al. , 2008, for text-
books on order statistics), we write the density of the quadruplet (XA(k),X
A
(k+1),X
B
(n−k),X
B
(n−k+1))
conditionally to A(∞) = m,B(−∞) = n as the function g defined for any reals a < b, c < d by:
g(a, b, c, d) =
m!
(k − 1)!(m − k − 1)! [F (a)]
k−1[1− F (b)]m−k−1f(a)f(b)
× n!
(k − 1)!(n − k − 1)! [F (c)]
n−k−1[1− F (d)]k−1f(c)f(d). (3)
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Integrating in d then c gives after some computation:
P (V = k|A(∞) = m,B(−∞) = n)
=
∫
R
∫
]a,+∞[
m!
(k − 1)!(m− k − 1)! [F (a)]
k−1[1− F (b)]m−k−1f(a)f(b)
×
[
FX(n−k+1)(b)− FX(n−k+1)(a) +
(
n
k
)
[F (b)]n−k[1− F (b)]k
]
dbda (4)
where FX(n−k+1) is the cumulative distribution function of the (n − k + 1)-th order statistics
of a sample of size n. Recall that if β(x, i, j) ,
∫ x
0
ui−1(1 − u)j−1 du is the incomplete beta
function, then FX(n−k+1)(u) =
n!
(n− k)!(k − 1)!β(F (u), n − k + 1, k). Using the changes of
variables u = F (a) and v = F (b) and some computations involving standard identities for the
beta functions yields the result given at equation (1).
Thanks to this simple but yet unnoted result (to our knowledge), we can proceed to the
analytical exact and asymptotic solutions for the general problem.
Remark 1. We underline that Lemma 1 does not stand if the distributions of the prices of ask
orders FA and bid orders FB are assumed to be different. The first proof given above uses
the fact that all ”bid” and ”ask” tag attributions to the submitted orders are equiprobable
when FA = FB = F . If FA 6= FB , then this is not the case and these probabilities are price-
dependent: the probability that an order submitted at a price lower or equal than p is an ask
order is
λAFA(p)
λAFA(p) + λBFB(p)
. Therefore, any reasoning mimicking the first proof would require
the evaluation of the traded volume conditionally on the placement of the n-th order, which
does not appear to be easily tractable. Trying to go as a workaround through the proof by
direct calculus using FA and FB (absolutely continuous with densities fA and fB), one would
reach integrals of the general form :
∫
]a,+∞[
fA(u)(1 − FA(u))iβ(FB(u), j, k) du,
which are tractable when FA = FB , but do not appear to be obviously so when FA 6= FB .
3 Exact and asymptotic distributions of the traded volume
The Poisson assumption for the bid and ask processes immediately yields the general form of the
unconditional distribution of the traded volume. With a little rewriting one straightforwardly
gets the general result.
Proposition 1. In the general call auction model with orders submission rate λ, market im-
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balance α and auction length T , the distribution of the traded volume is for any k ∈ N:
P(V = k) = e−λT
(
α(1− α)λ2T 2)k
(k!)2
+∞∑
i=0
+∞∑
j=0
(λT )i+j(
i+j+2k
i+k
) αi
i!
(1− α)j
j!
(5)
Note that this result does not depend on the orders’ price distribution F .
This form has symmetry properties (with respect to the processes of buy and sell orders,
expressed through the market imbalance α ∈ [0, 1]), and it is therefore convenient for symbolic
computation. However, any of the two sums can be nicely expressed using special functions,
which can be of interest in terms of computational implementation. For example,
P(V = k) = e−λT
(
α(1− α)λ2T 2)k +∞∑
i=0
(
k + i
k
)
(αλT )i
(i+ 2k)!
1F1 (k + 1, i+ 2k + 1, (1 − α)λT ) ,
(6)
where 1F1 is the confluent hypergeometric function (see e.g. Seaborn, 1991).
The result of proposition 1 generalizes to a general market imbalance the distribution found
in Mendelson (1982) in the symmetric case with no market imbalance. By setting α =
1
2
in
the result of proposition 1, and using some combinatorial rewriting including variants of the
Vandermonde identity (Gould, 1956), we obtain :
P(V = k) = e−
λT
2
(
λT
2
)2k 1
(2k)!
(
1 +
λT
2(2k + 1)
)
(7)
which was found by Mendelson (1982, equation 3.3). Furthermore, by setting k = 0, proposition
1 gives the probability that no trade will occur at time T during the clearing mechanism, which
is an important quantity in very illiquid markets, as well as the influence of the market imbalance
α on this quantity. Straightforward identities give for k = 0 and α 6= 1
2
:
P(V = 0) = e−αλT +
α
1− 2α
(
e−αλT − e−(1−α)λT
)
. (8)
Once again, in the symmetric case α =
1
2
, one retrieves by computing the limit of the above
expression:
P(V = 0) = e−
λT
2
(
1 +
λT
2
)
, (9)
which was obtained by Mendelson (1982, unnumbered equation p.1512).
Figure 2 plots several examples of the traded volume distribution in the case of an illiquid
market (λ = 10) and in the case of a more liquid market (λ = 100). In the example cases of
the illiquid market, the probability that no trade happens varies from 4% to 33% depending on
the market imbalance α. In the example cases of the liquid market, this probability is less than
10−5 even when the market is not balanced. As expected, the distribution is shifted to the left
as the market imbalance increases, i.e.
∣∣∣∣α− 12
∣∣∣∣ increases.
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Figure 2: Traded volume distribution (volume on the x-axis, mass probabilities on the y-axis)
for several values of market imbalance : α = 0.125 (plus), α = 0.25 (star), α = 0.375 (square),
α = 0.5 (triangle) and several types of market liquidity: λ = 10 (top) and λ = 100 (bottom).
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As hinted by figure 2, the traded volume is asymptotically normal as the market liquidity
increases. The mean is λTα(1 − α), which might have been guessed by taking the equivalent
of the mean of the hypergeometric distribution of lemma 1 as N → +∞, but the variance of
the traded volume, however, is not an intuitive function of the market imbalance. The rigorous
result is the following.
Proposition 2. In the general call auction model with orders submission rate λ, market im-
balance α and auction length T , in the very liquid case where λT → +∞, the distribution
of the traded volume is asymptotically normal with mean λTα(1 − α) and standard deviation√
λTα(1− α)(1 − 2α(1 − α)). Note that this result does not depend on the orders’ price distri-
bution F .
Proof. The problem is to determine the weak limit of the hypergeometric distribution of lemma
1 when the number of ask orders is Poisson with parameter αλT and the number of bid orders
is Poisson with parameter (1 − α)λT , or, equivalently, when the total number of orders N
is Poisson with parameter λT and the conditional number of bid orders nN is binomial with
parameters N and (1−α). The proof is based on two successive applications of limit theorems
for sequences of random variables with random indices, the first one on nN when N is assumed
deterministic, and the second one on N finally assumed random.
Let VN,n a random variable with hypergeometric distribution P(VN,n = k) =
(n
k
)(N−n
n−k
)
( N
N−n
) ,
0 ≤ k ≤ n ≤ N . Assume (nN )N is a deterministic sequence of natural integers such that
nN
N
−→
N→+∞
1 − α. Then VN,nN is weakly convergent to a Gaussian distribution (see e.g. Feller,
1968, section VII.7, Problem 10):
VN,nN −Nα(1 − α)√
Nα(1 − α)
d−→
N→+∞
N (0, 1). (10)
Assume now that nN is a random variable with binomial distribution B(N, 1 − α), and let
VN = VN,nN . Let also lN (s) denote the infimum of the s-quantile of nN . Standard convergence
of the binomial distribution is written:
nN −N(1− α)√
Nα(1− α)
d−→
N→+∞
N (0, 1), (11)
hence we may write: lN (s) = N(1−α) +Φ−1(s)
√
Nα(1 − α) + o(
√
N). Let us set 1−αN (s) ,
lN (s)
N
, aN (s) , NαN (s)(1 − αN (s)) and bN (s) ,
√
NαN (s)(1 − αN (s)). Straightforward com-
putations yield:
aN (s) = Nα(1− α) + (2α − 1)
√
Nα(1 − α)Φ−1(s) + o(
√
N), (12)
and
bN (s) =
√
Nα(1 − α) + o(
√
N). (13)
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Therefore,
aN (s)−Nα(1 − α)√
Nα(1 − α) −→N→+∞ Φ
−1(s)
2α− 1√
α(1 − α) and
bN (s)√
Nα(1 − α) −→N→+∞ 1. Hence,
applying Theorem 4 of Korolev (1993) on the weak convergence on sequences of random vari-
ables with random indices, we obtain that
VN −Nα(1− α)√
Nα(1− α) converges weakly to the sum of
two independant zero-mean normal distributions, one with standard deviation 1 and one with
standard deviation
|2α− 1|√
α(1− α) . By summing the variances and rescaling, we obtain:
VN −Nα(1− α)√
Nα(1 − α)(1− 3α(1 − α))
d−→
N→+∞
N (0, 1). (14)
Finally, assume now that Nk is a random variable with Poisson distribution with parameter
k = ⌊λT ⌋ and let lk(s) denote the infimum of the s-quantile of Nk. Standard convergence of
the Poisson distribution is written:
Nk − k√
k
d−→
k→+∞
N (0, 1), (15)
hence we may write: lk(s) = k +Φ
−1(s)
√
k + o(
√
k). Thanks to equation (14) we have:
Vlk(s) − lk(s)α(1 − α)√
lk(s)α(1 − α)(1 − 3α(1 − α))
d−→
k→+∞
N (0, 1). (16)
Let
ak(s) , lk(s)α(1 − α) = kα(1 − α) +
√
kα(1− α)Φ−1(s) + o(
√
k), (17)
and
bk(s) ,
√
lk(s)α(1 − α)(1 − 3α(1 − α)) =
√
kα(1 − α)(1 − 3α(1 − α)) + o(
√
k). (18)
This yields
ak(s)− kα(1 − α)√
kα(1− α)(1 − 3α(1 − α)) −→k→+∞ Φ
−1(s)
√
α(1− α)
1− 3α(1 − α)) (19)
and
bk(s)√
kα(1 − α)(1 − 3α(1− α)) −→k→+∞ 1. (20)
Hence, applying once again Theorem 4 of Korolev (1993), we finally obtain that:
Vk − kα(1− α)√
kα(1 − α)(1 − 3α(1 − α))
d−→
k→+∞
N
(
0,
√
1− 2α(1 − α)
1− 3α(1 − α)
)
, (21)
which, with one last rescaling, completes the proof.
The first moment of the distribution (but not the distribution) was approximately derived
by Mendelson (1982, equation 3.1) by resorting to asymptotic results from renewal theory.
Using our notations, it was found there that if the market is liquid enough (i.e. λ ≫ 1), then
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the expected traded volume is approximately the inverse of the expectation of the sum of two
independent exponential variables with parameters αλT and (1−α)λT , which gives α(1−α)λT
and is indeed the average traded volume obtained in proposition 2 when λ is large.
4 Exact and asymptotic distributions of the lower and upper
prices
We now extend lemma 1 to obtain the unconditional distributions of the lower and upper bound
of the possible clearing prices interval. Following lemma 1, the density of the lower bound of
the interval of potential clearing prices conditionally to the set {A(∞) = m,B(−∞) = n} is:
fL|A(∞)=m,B(−∞)=n(x) =
(n+m)!
(n− 1)!m! [F (x)]
n−1 [1− F (x)]m f(x), (22)
which gives the following result.
Proposition 3. In the general call auction model with orders submission rate λ, market imbal-
ance α, auction length T and price distribution F (absolutely continuous with density f), the
distribution of the lower bound L of the possible clearing prices admits the probability density
function fL defined for any x ∈ R as:
fL(x) =
(
eαλT − 1
)−1 (
e(1−α)λT − 1
)−1
f(x)
+∞∑
n=1
[(1− α)λT ]n
n!
[F (x)]n−1
(n− 1)!
+∞∑
m=1
(n+m)!
[αλT ]m
m!
[1− F (x)]m
m!
(23)
Symmetrically, the probability density function fU of the uper bound of the clearing prices range
is obtained by substituting α with 1− α and F (x) with 1− F (x) in the above formula.
Here again, we have highlighted the symmetric result in the proposition, but carrying out
some computations may lead to express these densities with a single series, such as:
fL(x) =
(1− α)λTf(x)e(1−α)λTF (x)
(eαλT − 1) (e(1−α)λT − 1)
[
− 1 + e−(1−α)λTF (x) (24)
×
+∞∑
n=0
((1− α)λTF (x))n
n!
1F1 (n+ 2, 1, αλT (1 − F (x)))
]
.
Figure 3 plots several examples of this distribution, showing the influence of the market
imbalance α in the liquid and non-liquid market cases. One guesses on these graphs that both
the lower and upper prices distributions converges to the same normal distribution as the market
liquidity increases. This result is formally stated and proven in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. In the general call auction model with orders submission rate λ, market im-
balance α, auction length T and price distribution F (absolutely continuous with density f), in
the very liquid case where λT → +∞, the distribution of the lower and upper bounds of the
12
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Figure 3: Lower (in black) and upper (in red) prices distributions (price on the x-axis, probabil-
ity density functions on the y-axis) for several values of market imbalance α = 0.125 (dotted),
α = 0.25 (dash-dotted), α = 0.375 (dashed), α = 0.5 (full) and several types of market liquidity:
λ = 10 (top) and λ = 100 (bottom). Price distribution is uniform on (0, 1) in these examples.
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possible clearing prices is asymptotically normal with mean F−1(1− α) and standard deviation
1
f(F−1(1− α))
√
2α(1 − α)
λT
.
Proof. Lemma 1 proves that conditionally on counting a total of N orders including n bid
orders, the lower price LN,n is distributed as the n-th statistics of a random sample with size
N distributed according to F . Assume temporarily that N is fixed and (nN )N is an sequence
of integers such that
nN
N
−→
N→+∞
1 − α. Then the weak convergence of central order statistics
(see e.g. David & Nagaraja, 2003, Theorem 10.3) states that:
√
N
(
LN,nN − F−1(1− α)
) d−→
N→+∞
N
(
0,
√
α(1 − α)
f(F−1(1− α))
)
. (25)
We now proceed by mimicking the proof of proposition 2, omitting details for the sake of brevity.
Assume now that nN is distributed according to a binomial distribution B(N, 1 − α). If lN (s)
is the infimum of the s-quantile of this distribution and 1 − αN (s) , lN (s)
N
, then by equation
(25):
LN,lN (s) − F−1(1− α)
1
f(F−1(1−α)
√
α(1−α)
N
d−→
N→+∞
N (0, 1) , (26)
and the weak convergence of the binomial distribution leads to a simple expansion for the inverse
of the absolutely continuous distribution F , which is written:
F−1(1− αN (s)) = F−1(1− α) + 1
f(F−1(1− α))
√
α(1 − α)
N
Φ−1(s) + o
(
N−1/2
)
. (27)
At this point, following Korolev (1993, Theorem 4), the second term of equation (27) is the
source of a new standard gaussian term in the convergence, and we obtain that:
√
N
(
LN,nN − F−1(1− α)
) d−→
N→+∞
N
(
0,
√
2
√
α(1− α)
f(F−1(1− α)
)
. (28)
Finally, lifting the deterministic assumption on N (i.e. reassuming that N = ⌊λT ⌋ is Poisson)
and re-applying the limit theorem for random indices leads to the weak convergence of the result
of the proposition.
Note that the proof for the convergence of the upper price distribution is identical, since
conditionally on counting a total of N orders including n bid orders, the upper price UN,n is
distributed as the n + 1-th statistics of a random sample with size N distributed according to
F .
Figure 4 illustrates the convergence of proposition 4 as the liquidity increases, using empirical
simulations of the model.
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Figure 4: Empirical densities of the lower prices centered and rescaled by the location and
scale parameters of proposition 4, as the liquidity increases : λ = 5 (diamond), λ = 10 (plus),
λ = 100 (stars). Full line is the standard gaussian. In these examples, empirical prices are
obtained by simulation with T = 1, α = 0.3 and prices uniformly distributed on (0, 1). The
empirical distribution is computed with 105 simulations.
5 Exact and asymptotic distributions of the range of clearing
prices
We now focus on the range of potential clearing prices, which is a proxy to the post-clearing
spread, and is therefore, along with the traded volume, a fundamental variable from a liquidity
point of view.
Thanks to the results of lemma 1, we know that the clearing range R is, conditionnally on
the set {A(∞) = m,B(−∞) = n}, the range between the n-th and the (n+1)-th order statistics
of an i.i.d. sample of size n+m with distribution F . It conditional density fR|A(∞)=m,B(−∞)=n
is therefore written :
fR|A(∞)=m,B(−∞)=n(δ) =
(n+m)!
(n− 1)!(m− 1)!
∫
R
[F (x)]n−1 f(x)f(x+ δ) [1− F (x+ δ)]m−1 dx.
(29)
In the special case where F is the uniform distribution on (0, 1), this conditional density can be
explicitly computed as:
fR|A(∞)=m,B(−∞)=n(δ) = (n +m)(1− δ)n+m−1, (30)
which in turn yields the result of proposition 5.
Proposition 5. In the call auction model with orders submission rate λ, market imbalance α,
auction length T and uniform orders’ price distribution on (0, 1), the distribution of the clearing
15
price range admits the probability density function fR defined for any δ ∈ (0, 1) as:
fR(δ) =
λTe−λTδ
(1− e−αλT ) (1− e−(1−α)λT )
[
1− (1− α)e−αλT (1−δ) − αe−(1−α)λT (1−δ)
]
. (31)
Thus it appears that in the case of uniform prices, the distribution of the clearing price range
is an exponential distribution with parameter λT modified by exponential terms functions of
the market imbalance. The general case does not exhibit such a simple formula for the exact
distribution. However, the next proposition proves that, even in the general case, the clearing
price range is asymptotically exponential.
Proposition 6. In the call auction model with orders submission rate λ, market imbalance
α, auction length T and price distribution F (absolutely continuous with continuous density
f), in the very liquid case where λT → +∞, the distribution of the clearing price range is
asymptotically exponential with parameter (inverse of the mean) λTf(F−1(1− α)).
Proof. Conditionally on counting a total of N orders including n bid orders, the clearing price
range RN,n is distributed as the range between the n-th and the n+1-th statistics of a random
sample with size N distributed according to F . If (nN )N is a sequence of integers such that
nN
N
−→
N→∞
1 − α, then the distribution of NRN,nN is known to be weakly convergent to an
exponential distribution with parameter f(F−1(1−α)) (see e.g. David & Nagaraja, 2003, p.328,
refering to (Pyke, 1965)). The remaining part of the proof mimicks the previous proofs, and as
a consequence it is omitted for brevity. It turns out that when N is Poisson with parameter k
and nN is binomial with parameters N and 1− α, NRN,nN has the same weak limit as in the
deterministic case, hence the result.
Figure 5 illustrates the convergence of proposition 6 as the liquidity increases, using empirical
simulations of the model.
As for the scaling of proposition 6, the fact that the clearing price range scales as the inverse
of λT as the liquidity increases is in agreement with Mendelson (1982, equation 4.2). Note
also that this in agreement with the scaling of the spread suggested using dimensional analysis
by Smith et al. (2003), although in a very different trading environment (a continuous double
auction).
Moreover, as for the limit distribution of proposition 6, the basic Poisson model for the
call auction thus suggests that the exponential distribution is an acceptable zero-intelligence
approximation for the post-clearing spread distribution. Recall that previous empirical results
on the distribution of the bid-ask spread during a continuous double auction have highlighted the
fat tails of these distribution (see e.g. Plerou et al. , 2005; Gu et al. , 2007, on U.S. and Chinese
stocks respectively). However, the spread as any other financial quantity exhibits intraday
variations (see e.g. Chan et al. , 1995, among early works). In particular, the spread observed
right after a call auction is significantly larger than the one observed during a continuous double
auction (see Gu et al. , 2007, figure 2) and may therefore exhibit different statistical properties
that, to our knowledge, are yet to be studied.
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Figure 5: Empirical densities of the clearing price range scaled by the parameter of proposition
6 as the liquidity increases : λ = 5 (diamond), λ = 10 (+), λ = 50 (stars). In these examples,
empirical price ranges are obtained by simulation with T = 1, α = 0.3 and orders’ prices
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1.
In a first step in this direction, we conclude this section by a brief empirical illustration of the
exponential distribution as an approximation of the distribution of the post-clearing spread. For
a stock that is part of the CAC 40 index, each trading day at the Paris stock Exchange starts with
an opening call auction similar to the one studied in this paper (Euronext, 2013, 2014). At 9:00
a.m., the auction is cleared, and there results a post-clearing spread (and book) which is the ini-
tial state for the continuous double auction that starts at this time. We have randomly selected
12 stocks from the CAC 40 index : Air Liquide (AIRP.PA, chemicals), Alstom (ALSO.PA, in-
dustrial machinery), Axa (AXAF.PA, insurance), BNP Paribas (BNPP.PA, banking), Bouygues
(BOUY.PA, construction, telecom and media), Carrefour (CARR.PA, retail/wholesale), Danone
(DANO.PA, food products), Michelin (MICP.PA, tires), Renault (RENA.PA, automobiles),
Sanofi (SASY.PA, pharmaceuticals), Vinci (SGEF.PA, construction), Total (TOTF.PA, oil and
gas). For each of these 12 stocks, we use an extraction from the Thomson Reuters Tick History
database to get the opening bid and ask quotes from March 3rd, 2011 to June 28th, 2013. After
data cleaning (missing days), we obtain a sample of post-clearing spreads of size 592 to 595,
depending on the stock. Figure 6 plots, for each of these 12 stocks, the distribution function
of the post-clearing spread, and the exponential distribution function fitted on the data using
maximum-likelihood estimation. To get an idea of the tail of the distribution (although remem-
ber we only have roughly 600 points), Figure 7 plots the logarithm of the empirical survival
distribution function of the spread, and its fitted exponential counterpart (a straight line in the
semilog scale used).
These empirical observations indicate that the exponential distribution predicted for the
clearing price range by the basic Poisson model might indeed be an acceptable approximation
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Figure 6: Empirical cumulative distribution function of the post-clearing spread computed for
12 CAC 40 stocks traded on the Paris Stock Exchange from March 2011 to June 2013. Full line
is the exponential MLE fit.
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Figure 7: Logarithm of the empirical survival function of the distribution of the post-clearing
spread computed for 12 CAC 40 stocks traded on the Paris Stock Exchange from March 2011
to June 2013. Straight line is the exponential MLE fit.
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of the distribution of the spread computed by the clearing mechanism of the opening call auction.
As a future work, the next empirical step would be to test whether a valid link can be establish
between the parameter of this exponential distribution and the parameters defining the flows
of submitted orders during the call, in order to (in)validate the scaling suggested in proposition
6. Note however that this will require a completely different set of data, since all the order
book data (not just the bid and ask quotes) during all the pre-opening call period (not just the
opening values) is needed to estimate the parameters of the order flow.
6 Allowing for the cancellation of trading orders
We have until now presented results in a call auction model where submitted orders cannot be
cancelled. This has allowed us easy comparisons with previous results. It is however simple to
add a cancellation mechanism. Let us assume from now on that any submitted order may be
cancelled between the moment of its submission and the closing of the call auction at T . Let
us assume furthermore that the lifetimes of orders (i.e. the time interval between their submis-
sion and their potential cancellation) form a set of independent random variables distributed
exponentially with parameter θA for ask orders, and θB for bid orders.
Then the number of ask orders at time T is distributed as the value of a birth-and-death
process with constant birth rate λA and linear death rate nθA. If pn(t) denotes the probability
that the process is equal to n at time t, then the set of Kolmogorov forward equations is written
for all n ∈ N∗ (see e.g. Bremaud, 1999, chap. 8):
dpn(t)
dt
= −(λA + nθA)pn(t) + λpn−1(t)1n≥1 + (n+ 1)θApn+1(t). (32)
Classically, this is explicitly solvable through the use of the moment generating function, and we
obtain that the number of ask orders at time T is distributed according to a Poisson distribution
with parameter
λA
θA
(
1− e−θAT
)
. A similar result is obviously obtained for the bid orders.
Therefore, all the developments of the previous sections are applicable to the general model
with cancellation. It suffices to substitute λ and α in the previous formulas from proposition 2
to proposition 5, with respectively λ′ and α′ defined by :
λ′ =
λ
T
(
α
θA
(1− e−θAT ) + 1− α
θB
(1− e−θBT )
)
(33)
α′ =
1
1 +
(
1
α − 1
)
θA
θB
1−e−θBT
1−e−θAT
(34)
Obviously, if T → 0 or equivalently if θA → 0 and θB → 0, then the cancellation mechanism is
negligible and α′ → α and λ′ → λ. Note also that in the case θA = θB = θ, then both bid and
ask are modified the same way, and as expected α′ = α, i.e. market imbalance is unchanged.
However, if θA and θB are different, then the cancellations may either increase or lessen the
imbalance of the market.
The formulas obtained are in accordance with the expected effect of the cancellation mech-
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anism on the call auction : as θA and θB increases, less orders enter the clearing process at time
T , and therefore the traded volume decreases, while the clearing price range and the variance
of the clearing prices increase. More precisely, the scaling obtained is roughly proportional. Let
us simplify the formulas to follow by assuming that bid and ask orders have the same expected
lifetime θ−1A = θ
−1
B = θ
−1. In the liquid case where λ→ +∞, the asymptotic distribution of the
traded volume is then:
N
(
λ
θ
(1− e−θT )α(1 − α),
√
λ
θ
(1− e−θT )α(1 − α)(1− 2α(1 − α))
)
, (35)
i.e. the mean traded volume is roughly inversely proportional to θ. The asymptotic distribution
of the clearing price is:
N
(
F−1(1− α), 1
f(F−1(1− α))
√
2θα(1− α)
λ(1− e−θT )
)
, (36)
and finally, the asymptotic distribution of the clearing price range is:
E
(
λ
θ
(1− e−θT )f(F−1(1− α))
)
, (37)
i.e. both the variance of the prices and the average clearing price range are roughly proportional
to θ, the inverse of the expected lifetimes of orders.
7 Conclusion
We have derived the exact and asymptotic distributions of the traded volume, of the lower
and upper bound of the clearing prices and of the clearing price range of a basic call auction
model in which trading orders are submitted according to Poisson processes, with independent
random prices with any general distribution, and a Markovian mechanism of cancellation. The
results obtained here generalize previous studies of the call auction in which the mathematical
problem was only tackle through approximations. Our work will hopefully raise the interest
of the community in the need for more theoretical and empirical studies of the call auction.
Firstly, the call auction is already widely used as a trading mechanism for the opening and
closing of many financial markets, but has received until now considerably less attention than
its continuous counterpart. Secondly, the recent regulation movement and the need to avoid
dangerous phenomena directly linked to high-frequency trading strategies in a continuous double
auction may be an opportunity for the call auction proponents to ascertain the potential benefits
of this trading system. In any case, this calls for more empirical and theoretical works on the
call auction.
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